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The definition of “personal information” or “personal data” is foundational to the 
application of data protection laws. One aspect of these definitions is that the information 
must be linked to an identifiable individual, which is incorporated in the requirement 
that the information must be “about” or “relating to” an individual. This article examines 
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Canada and the European Union. In particular, it contrasts the decisions rendered 
by the Federal Court of Australia in Privacy Commissioner v Telstra Corporation 
Ltd and by the European Court of Justice decisions in Scarlet Extended and Patrick 
Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutschland as well as the new General Data Protection 
Regulation with Canadian law. This article also compares how the three jurisdictions 
deal with the vexed issue of IP addresses as personal information where the connection 
between the IP address and a particular individual often raises particular problems.
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I. Introduction
Data protection laws aim to protect personal privacy by regulating the collection, processing and transfer of “personal information” 
(Australia and Canada), “personal data” (European Union) or “personally 
identifiable information” (United States). While the definitions of these 
terms vary across jurisdictions, what they have in common is that they 
are of fundamental significance. Data that does not contain information 
about an identified or identifiable individual in the sense of the respective 
definition falls outside the scope of data protection laws.
Differences in the definition of “personal information” have 
relevance not only for the application of domestic data protection laws 
but also affect data transfers between countries. Many domestic data 
protection regimes impose restrictions on the export of personal data to 
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a third country, particulary if the data protection level in that country is 
weaker than the law of the exporting state. This is intended to prevent 
the bypassing of national data protection laws by the transfer of data 
to a third country without an adequate level of protection. However, 
even if the substantive data protection laws of a third country provide 
a comparable level of protection overall, a closer look at the scope of 
application of its data protection regime may also be necessary. If a third 
country adopts a narrower understanding of the term “personal data”, 
that country’s privacy laws will not apply to some data that would be 
protected by the laws of the exporting country. 
This article will analyse recent developments relating to these 
definitions in Australia and the European Union and provide a comparison 
with Canadian data privacy law. The article is prompted by an Australian 
appellate decision on the definition of “personal information” under the 
Privacy Act.1 In its decision, Privacy Commissioner v Telstra Corporation 
Ltd,2 the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia also considered 
relevant Canadian jurisprudence. In particular, it referred to the decision 
of the Federal Court of Appeal in Canada (Information Commissioner) v 
Canada (Transportation Accident Investigation & Safety Board).3 This 
article will also consider recent developments in the European Union 
and, in particular, the new General Data Protection Regulation (“GDPR”)4 
and two recent decisions of the European Court of Justice. The practical 
consequences of the differences between the terms will be explained using 
the example of the classification of Internet Protocol (“IP”) addresses as 
personal information or as personal data, respectively.
1. Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (Austl) [Austl Privacy Act].
2. [2017] FCAFC 4 [Telstra FCAFC].
3. 2006 FCA 157 [Canada (Information Commissioner)].
4. EC, Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to 
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and 
repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), [2016] 
OJ, L 119/1 [GDPR].
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II. The Necessary Link between the Information and 
the Individual
The necessary link between the information in question and the individual 
differs in Australian, Canadian and European Union law.
A. Australian Law
Australia’s federal data protection laws are contained primarily in the 
Privacy Act. The Act is informed by the 1980 OECD Guidelines on the 
Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data5 and is mirrored 
in data protection laws in a number of Australian states and territories. 
The Privacy Act contains thirteen Australian Privacy Principles (“APPs”), 
which govern the collection, use, disclosure and storage of personal and 
sensitive information and how individuals may access and correct records 
containing such information. The APPs apply to most commonwealth 
government agencies and large private sector organisations (the so-called 
“APP entities”). 
The current definition of “personal information” in section 6 was 
inserted into the Privacy Act in 2014.6 It states:
information or an opinion about an identified individual, or an individual who 
is reasonably identifiable:
(a) whether the information or opinion is true or not; and
(b) whether the information or opinion is recorded in a material form or not.7
This represented a modernisation of the previous definition, which had 
been unchanged in the legislation since 1988 and defined (also in section 
6) “personal information” as follows:
information or an opinion (including information or an opinion forming part 
of a database), whether true or not, and whether recorded in a material form 
or not, about an individual whose identity is apparent, or can reasonably be 
5. OECD Council, OECD Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and 
Transborder Flows of Personal Data, (1980) [OECD Guidelines].
6. The Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012 (Cth) 
(Austl), took effect from 12 March 2014.
7. Austl Privacy Act, supra note 1, s 6(1). 
5(2018) 4 CJCCL
ascertained, from the information or opinion.8
The new definition followed the recommendation of the Australian 
Law Reform Commission, which undertook a comprehensive review 
of Australian privacy laws in 2008.9 The Explanatory Memorandum to 
the Amendment Bill explained that the amendment did not significantly 
change the scope of what is considered to be personal information.10 
In line with international standards, the new definition focuses on 
“identification” rather than the “identity” of the relevant individual. A 
related change is that it is no longer a requirement of the current definition 
that the person’s identity must be apparent or reasonably ascertainable 
“from the information or opinion” itself. Information can now also be 
personal if it does not itself identify an individual but if it does so when 
combined with “other” information,11 provided that the identification is 
reasonable. On that basis, it is likely that the new definition is “broader 
in scope than its predecessor”.12 
Most debate surrounding the definition of personal information 
is related to the issue of when a person is “identified” or “reasonably 
identifiable”.13 These discussions have become more important in light of 
8. Ibid, as it appeared in 1988.
9. Austl, Commonwealth, Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your 
Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice (Report No 108) (ALRC, 
2008) [ALRC, For Your Information].
10. Austl, Commonwealth, Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) 
Bill 2012 Explanatory Memorandum (2012) at 53 [Austl, Commonwealth, 
Privacy Amendment Bill 2012 Explanatory Memorandum]. 
11. Austl, Commonwealth, Office of the Australian Information 
Commissioner, What is personal information? (OAIC, 2017) at 7 [OAIC, 
What is personal information?]. 
12. Anna von Dietze & Anne-Marie Allgrove, “Australian privacy reforms: an 
overhauled data protection regime for Australia” (2014) 4:4 International 
Data Privacy Law 326 at 328. 
13.  See e.g. Anne SY Cheung, “Re-personalizing Personal Data in the Cloud” 
in Anne SY Cheung & Rolf H Weber, eds, Privacy and Legal Issues in 
Cloud Computing (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015) 69 at 69.
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significant recent advances in re-identification technologies.14 While de-
identified information falls outside data protection laws, it has become 
contentious when information is sufficiently de-identified in the sense 
that, even with the use of re-identification technologies, individuals are 
no longer “reasonably identifiable”.15 However, this article will focus its 
attention on another aspect of the definition, i.e. the required linkage 
between the information and the person to which it is said to relate. 
This has previously been given less attention but was at the centre of the 
decision of the Australian Federal Court in the Telstra matter.
While the OECD Guidelines define personal data as “information 
relating to an identified or identifiable individual”,16 the Australian 
definitions — in their previous and current versions — refer to information 
“about” an individual. The Australian Law Reform Commission did not 
recommend a change to this formulation, noting that:
although a number of international instruments use the term ‘relates to’, 
the Privacy Act terminology is consistent with the APEC Privacy Framework 
and reflects that fact that the information must be about an identified or 
reasonably identifiable individual.17 
It has long been a matter of contention whether this formulation “about 
an individual” required a more direct link between the data and the 
individual than the formulation “relating to an … individual”.18 Any 
differences in meaning may be relevant in cases where information has 
14. Jane Henriksen-Bulmer & Sheridan Jeary, “Re-identification Attacks—A 
Systematic Literature Review” (2016) 36:6 International Journal of 
Information Management 1184.
15. Council of Europe, Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 
05/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques, (2014) 0829/14/EN, WP216; 
Information and Privacy Commissioner, Ontario, Canada, “Big Data and 
Innovation, Setting the Record Straight: De-identification Does Work” , 
by Ann Cavoukian & Daniel Castro (Toronto: IPC, ITIF, 16 June 2014).
16. OECD Council, Recommendation of the Council concerning Guidelines 
governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data 
(2013) at Part I, 1. b). 
17. ALRC, For Your Information, supra note 9 at para 6.51.  
18. See e.g. Mark Burdon & Alissa McKillop, “The Google Street View 
Wi-Fi Scandal and its Repercussions for Privacy Regulation” (2013) 39:3 
Monash University Law Review 702 at 712.
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only a tenuous connection with an individual, and in particular where 
information identifies a device rather than an individual. In the Telstra 
litigation, this issue became central when a technology journalist named 
Ben Grubb sought access to the personal metadata held by Telstra, his 
mobile phone service provider. Telstra refused access to mobile network 
data that could be linked to Mr. Grubb only through cross-matching 
between the various databases, systems and networks which Telstra 
operated. The Australian Administrative Tribunal overturned the Privacy 
Commissioner’s determination that the refusal to provide access to 
such metadata was in breach of privacy principles.19 This decision was 
confirmed by the Full Court of the Federal Court.20
1. The Telstra Determination by the Privacy 
Commissioner
The Telstra decision grappled with the issue of whether the Australian 
definition contains two cumulative elements: first, that the data must be 
about a person; secondly, that the data must enable the identification of 
this person.21 Before the decision of the Full Federal Court, the definition 
of personal information was considered in the 2008 inquiry by the 
Australian Law Reform Commission into Privacy Law and Practice22 in 
19. Telstra Corporation Ltd v Privacy Commissioner, [2015] AATA 991 [Telstra 
AAT].
20. Telstra FCAFC, supra note 2.
21. Re Grubb and Telstra Corp Ltd, [2015] AICmr 35 (Austl) [Re Grubb].
22. ALRC, For Your Information, supra note 9, ch 6. 
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a number of decisions of the Australian Administrative Tribunal23 and in 
guidance notes of the Privacy Commissioner.24 However, the notion of 
personal information had not been the subject of judicial analysis at the 
appellate level in Australia.
The opportunity for obtaining authoritative guidance arose from 
a privacy complaint by Mr. Grubb against Telstra. In 2013, when 
Australia’s metadata retention legislation was being debated, Mr. Grubb 
sought access to all metadata that Telstra held about his mobile phone 
service. At that time, the (former) National Privacy Principle (“NPP”) 
6.1 in the Privacy Act gave individuals the right to access, subject to some 
exceptions, their own personal information held by an organisation, such 
as Telstra.25 
When Telstra refused to provide access to all data requested, Mr. 
Grubb filed a complaint under section 36 of the Privacy Act. During 
an investigation by the Privacy Commissioner, Telstra provided access 
to further call data contained in billing records but continued to refuse 
access to some mobile network data, such as IP address information,26 
23. Re Lobo and Department of Immigration and Citizenship, [2011] AATA 
705 (concerning the definition of personal information in the Freedom 
of Information Act 1982 (Cth) (Austl)); Re Denehy and Superannuation 
Complaints Tribunal, [2012] AATA 608. See also WL v Randwick City 
Council (GD), [2007] NSWADTAP 58 (Austl) (concerning the definition 
in the Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) 
(Austl)); WL v La Trobe University (General), [2005] VCAT 2592 (Austl) 
(concerning the definition in the (former) Information Privacy Act 2000 
(Vic) (Austl)); Mark Burdon & Paul Telford, “The Conceptual Basis of 
Personal Information in Australian Privacy Law” (2010) 17:1 Murdoch 
University Electronic Journal of Law 1.
24. Office of the Australian Information Commissioner, “APP guidelines” 
(February 2014) at paras B.79-B.88, online: OAIC <https://www.oaic.
gov.au/resources/agencies-and-organisations/app-guidelines/archived/
chapter-b-app-guidelines-v1.pdf>.
25. Austl Privacy Act, supra note 1 in the pre-2014 version.
26. That is a number that is assigned to and identifies Mr. Grubb’s mobile 
device when it communicates with the internet.
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Uniform Resource Locator (“URL”) information27 and cell tower data.28 
Telstra argued that “the metadata in dispute, which [sat] on its network 
management systems, [was] not personal information as defined under 
[section 6 of ] the Privacy Act”.29 Telstra submitted that Mr. Grubb’s 
identity was neither “apparent nor [could] it reasonably be ascertained 
from that data”30 because it could allegedly only be linked to him through 
difficult and expensive cross-matching between the various databases, 
systems and networks Telstra operated. In May 2015, the Privacy 
Commissioner made a determination against Telstra under section 52 of 
the Privacy Act. The Commissioner held that Telstra’s ability to provide 
this kind of data to law enforcement in a large number of cases was 
“indicative of its ability to ascertain with accuracy an individual’s identity 
from metadata linked to that individual”31 and further that, in light of 
Telstra’s extensive resources, it was also reasonably able to ascertain it. On 
that basis, the Privacy Commissioner determined that the metadata in 
question was “personal information” and the refusal to provide access to 
it was “in breach of NPP 6.1”.32
2. The AAT Decision in Telstra
On application by Telstra, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (“AAT”) 
of Australia set aside the Commissioner’s determination. In a decision 
of December 2015, Deputy President Forgie did not primarily engage 
with the issue of whether Mr. Grubb was reasonably identifiable from 
the metadata held in Telstra’s mobile network systems. Instead, she 
considered that the words “about an individual” in the definition of 
personal information raised a threshold issue. She stated that:
the first step is to ask whether the information or opinion is about an 
individual. If it is not, that is an end of the matter. If it is, the second step in the 
27. That is information that identifies the websites Mr. Grubb visited.
28. That is geo-location data that identifies from where Mr. Grubb used his 
mobile phone service.
29. Re Grubb, supra note 21 at para 34. 
30. Ibid. 
31. Ibid at para 83.
32. Ibid at para 106.
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characterisation process is to ask whether the identity of that individual “… is 
apparent or can reasonably be ascertained, from the information or opinion”.33
This finding was surprising because both parties appeared to have 
proceeded on the basis that the determinative issue was whether Mr. 
Grubb’s identity was apparent or could be reasonably ascertained from 
the information he sought access to. This assumption was in line with 
academic commentary that suggested that:
in most cases, it may not be appropriate to talk of two separate (although 
cumulative) conditions for making data ‘personal’; the first condition can 
be embraced by the second, in the sense that data will normally relate to, or 
concern, a person if it enables that person’s identification. In other words, the 
basic criterion appearing in these definitions is that of identifiability – that is, 
the potential of data to enable [the] identification of a person.34
As a result of the Telstra litigation, this conventional wisdom no longer 
applies to Australia. 
Forgie DP identified the required characterisation task with the 
following question: “Is the information about an individual being, in this 
case, Mr. Grubb or is it about something else”?35 Adopting this approach, 
the Deputy President considered that the mobile network data generated 
by Mr. Grubb’s calls or messages was “information about the service it 
provides to Mr. Grubb but not about him”36 — notwithstanding the 
fact that the individual who obtained the service was ascertainable from 
this information. Such a binary characterisation appeared to disregard 
the possibility that information — just as it can be about more than one 
individual — can also be both about an individual and about a service 
provided to that individual. The decision did not elucidate how the 
distinction between information about an individual and information 
about something else was to be drawn, for example, when information is 
33. Telstra AAT, supra note 19 at para 97 [emphasis in original].
34. Lee A Bygrave, Data Privacy Law: An International Perspective (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2014) at 129–30 (generally on the definitions of 
personal in international instruments).
35. Telstra AAT, supra note 19 at para 111.
36. Ibid at para 112 (this was despite the fact that, as the Deputy President 
accepted, the mobile network data may identify Mr. Grubb when 
combined with other data).
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sufficiently related to an individual so as to be regarded as being “about 
the individual”. 
3. The Full Federal Court Decision in Telstra
The Privacy Commissioner formed the view that the AAT decision left 
too much uncertainty regarding the definition of “personal information” 
and appealed to the Federal Court. Privacy advocates welcomed this 
move because it provided the prospect of detailed judicial guidance by 
the Federal Court on this basic concept in Australia’s privacy legislation. 
It was also hoped that the hearing would provide a forum to consider the 
extensive case law that has developed internationally on the meaning of 
personal information, and particularly in relation to metadata.
However, in a decision published in January 2017, the Full Court 
gave short shrift to the Privacy Commissioner’s appeal, as well as to the 
application by two privacy organisations to be heard as amici curiae. The 
main judgment, delivered by Justices Kenny and Edelman (the latter now 
a judge of the High Court of Australia), held that the appeal concerned 
only one very “narrow question of statutory interpretation”.37 This was, 
whether the words “about an individual”, in the pre-2014 version of 
section 6, had any substantive operation. Contrary to the submission 
on behalf of the Privacy Commissioner, the Court unanimously held 
that they did.38 In doing so, Kenny and Edelman JJ (with whom Justice 
Dowsett agreed in a short judgment) endorsed the view of Forgie DP 
that the Privacy Act establishes a two-stage test for determining that 
information is personal information. 
The Court did not examine whether the AAT had erred in its 
application of this definition to the facts, because in its view, no 
appeal ground had raised this for consideration.39As a result, it was not 
reviewed which of Mr. Grubb’s mobile phone metadata was personal 
37. Telstra FCAFC, supra note 2 at para 73.
38. Ibid at para 80.
39. Ibid.
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information because it was “about” Mr. Grubb.40 The fact that the 
Federal Court concentrated on a narrow, technical point dashed the 
expectations of privacy professionals that the decision might become a 
landmark judgment that would fully resolve the issues raised in the AAT 
decision. Nevertheless, the Court provided some observations on how 
the definition of “personal information” operates in practice. The Privacy 
Commissioner decided not to appeal the matter to the High Court, 
which makes it pertinent to review these comments on the operation of 
the definition. 
Kenny and Edelman JJ stated:
[t]he words “about an individual” direct attention to the need for the individual 
to be a subject matter of the information or opinion. This requirement might 
not be difficult to satisfy. Information and opinions can have multiple subject 
matters. Further, on the assumption that the information refers to the totality 
of the information requested, then even if a single piece of information is 
not “about an individual” it might be about the individual when combined 
with other information. However, in every case it is necessary to consider 
whether each item of personal information requested, individually or in 
combination with other items, is about an individual. This will require an 
evaluative conclusion, depending upon the facts of any individual case, just 
as a determination of whether the identity can reasonably be ascertained will 
require an evaluative conclusion.41
4. Practical Consequences of the Telstra Litigation
The clarification by the Full Court in Telstra that information can have 
multiple subject matters is welcome because, as discussed above, the 
approach adopted by the AAT appeared to suggest that the characterisation 
task is black-or-white — i.e. that information will be either about an 
individual or about something else. The judgment of Kenny and Edelman 
40. The enactment of the mandatory data retention legislation through the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) 
Act 2015 (Cth) (Austl) has put this question beyond doubt because the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) (Austl) now 
contains an express provision (s 187LA) that metadata required to be 
retained by the telecommunications provider is taken to be “personal 
information” for the purposes of the Privacy Act. 
41. Telstra FCAFC, supra note 2 at para 63.
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JJ also clarifies that the assessment of whether the individual’s identity is 
apparent or can be ascertained must take into account other information 
with which the information in question can be combined.42 
However, because of the way the appeal was argued, the Federal 
Court was not obliged to provide further assistance on how the evaluative 
task is to be undertaken.43 In particular, the Court left open, just as the 
AAT did, the approach to determining the issue of when the link between 
information and an individual is so tenuous that it cannot be said that 
the information is “about an individual”. Kenny and Edelman JJ gave 
as an example that the colour of Mr. Grubb’s mobile phone was not 
information they considered to be about him, but they did not explain 
why this was not the case.44 
The difficulties posed by the characterisation task can be illustrated 
with the common example of IP addresses. IP addresses were part of 
the metadata requested by Mr. Grubb, and their characterisation as 
personal data is a vexed issue also in other jurisdictions. An IP address is 
allocated by the Internet Service Provider (“ISP”) to a subscriber’s device 
so that a particular communication on the internet can be delivered to 
that device. It is standard practice for many website operators to log the 
IP addresses of webpage visitors, which raises the question of whether 
these data logs are personal information and, therefore, fall under data 
protection legislation. Most connections rely on dynamic IP addresses, 
which are assigned by the ISP whenever the device connects to the 
internet and which change regularly. An IP address identifies a specific 
network device rather than the individual using that device, and dynamic 
IP addresses may change over time. On that basis, Forgie DP held that a 
dynamic IP address is not information about an individual because “[t]he 
connection between the person using a mobile device and an IP address 
is … ephemeral”.45 The Deputy President did not consider, however, that 
information, even when it is not directly about an individual, may become 
personal if it may be linked to an individual through indirect means, such 
42. Telstra FCAFC, supra note 2. 
43. Ibid.
44. Ibid.
45. Telstra AAT, supra note 19 at para 113.
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as through the interrogation of and matching across multiple databases. 
The decision of the Federal Court suggests that a more nuanced approach 
may be needed, in particular one that considers whether the information, 
in combination with other information, is to be regarded as being “about 
an individual”.46  
It is important to note that the judgment of the Federal Court 
concerned the definition of “personal information” as it applied before 
March 12, 2014. Since that date, the definition has been amended to 
“… information or an opinion about an identified individual, or an 
individual who is reasonably identifiable …”, so as to align it more 
closely with international legal instruments.47 NPP 6.1 has been replaced 
by Australian Privacy Principle 12.1, which adopts different language 
but is otherwise similar. Despite these changes in the wording, the 
Court’s reasoning is likely to remain applicable because the current 
definition retains that the information or opinion must be “about an … 
individual”.48 A key difference between the old and the current definition 
of personal information is that the individual no longer needs to be 
identifiable “from the information or opinion”. In relation to the old 
definition, Kenny and Edelman JJ stated that: 
whether information is “about an individual” might depend upon the breadth 
that is given to the expression “from the information or opinion”. In other 
words, the more loose the causal connection required by the word “from”, 
the greater the amount of information which could potentially be “personal 
information” and the more likely it will be that the words “about an individual” 
will exclude some of that information from National Privacy Principle 6.1.49
It is unclear what significance these comments have for the purposes of 
46. As will be discussed below, this is also the position taken under the 
equivalent provisions in the European Union. See e.g. the recent 
decision of the European Court of Justice in the case of Patrick Breyer 
v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, [2016] EUECJ C-582/14 [Breyer] (in 
relation to website operators) and previously Scarlet Extended SA v Société 
belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM), [2011] EUECJ 
C-70/10 [Scarlet Extended] (in relation to ISP providers).
47. ALRC, For Your Information, supra note 9 at para 6.53.
48. Austl Privacy Act, supra note 1, s 6(1).
49. Telstra FCAFC, supra note 2 at para 64 [emphasis in original].
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the new definition, which no longer contains the limiting expression 
“from the information or opinion”. It would be concerning if this was 
understood to attribute an even more significant exclusionary function 
to the words “about an individual”.
Unfortunately, the Telstra litigation has provided few new insights on 
when information is to be considered “personal information” under the 
Privacy Act. In many cases, information will fall clearly either within or 
outside the definition of “personal information”. As far as metadata held 
by telecommunications providers under the mandatory data retention 
laws is concerned, the matter was put beyond doubt through statutory 
deeming provisions. The issue remains live in other contexts, however, 
such as when businesses or other organisations employ cookie technology 
to record the IP addresses of website visitors.50 The classification also 
continues to be difficult when information (such as internal business data) 
does not directly identify any individual but can be linked to individuals 
through indirect means, such as data matching across databases.51 In cases 
of doubt, the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner advises 
organisations and agencies in updated guidance notes to err on the side 
of caution and treat this information as personal information.52 This 
recommendation confirms that the definition of “personal information” 
— described by the Privacy Commissioner as “arguably the most 
important term in the Privacy Act”53 — remains in significant respects 
uncertain.
The Explanatory Memorandum to the Privacy Enhancement Bill 
stated that the amendment “also brings the definition in line with 
50. See Robert Slattery & Marilyn Krawitz, “Mark Zuckerberg, the Cookie 
Monster – Australian Privacy Law and Internet Cookies” (2014) 16:1 
Flinders Law Journal 1.
51. See e.g. Waters v Transport for NSW, [2018] NSWCATAD 40 (Austl) 
(considering the collection of personal information by Transport for NSW 
users of the electronic travel card system “Opal”). 
52. OAIC, What is personal information?, supra note 11 at 17.
53. Timothy Pilgrim, “Privacy Awareness Week Launch 2016” Office of 
the Australian Information Commissioner (16 May 2016), online: 
OAIC <https://www.oaic.gov.au/media-and-speeches/speeches/privacy-
awareness-week-launch-2016>.
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international standards and precedents”.54 On that basis, it was expected 
that the revised definition of personal information would be “interpreted 
with regard to its counterparts in the EU and elsewhere”.55 This, however, 
did not occur in Telstra FCAFC.56 In fact, the Full Court was highly 
critical of the submission of the prospective amici curiae that sought to 
draw the Court’s attention to international data protection sources. The 
Court took particular issue with reliance on overseas materials which 
concerned “legislation which was worded differently, and based upon a 
different context and background even though ultimately deriving from 
the same broadly worded international instruments”.57 Unfortunately, 
the decision of the Full Court does not seem to acknowledge the degree 
of international consensus on the basic definitions of data privacy 
legislation and the fact that Australia’s legislation was expressly intended 
to reflect settled international practice. 
It is correct that the international instruments have varying 
character. The OECD Guidelines maintain a high degree of flexibility 
and do not seek to provide the adoption of a particular approach. In their 
Explanatory Memorandum, it is stated that the “precise dividing line 
between personal data in the sense of information relating to identified 
or identifiable individuals and anonymous data may be difficult to draw 
and must be left to the regulation of each Member country”.58
The next section of the article will explore the Canadian definition 
of personal information. Of all of the international material presented to 
the Full Court, the Court was most drawn to Canadian jurisprudence. 
In particular, the decision in Canada (Information Commissioner)59 was 
described as “the most relevant, indeed the only potentially relevant, 
authority”.60 The next section will, therefore, analyse the Canadian 
54. Austl, Commonwealth, Privacy Amendment Bill 2012 Explanatory 
Memorandum, supra note 10 at 53.
55. Dietze & Allgrove, supra note 12 at 328.
56. Telstra FCAFC, supra note 2 at para 71.
57. Ibid. 
58. OECD Guidelines, supra note 5 at 41.
59. Canada (Information Commissioner), supra note 3. 
60. Telstra FCAFC, supra note 2 at para 74. 
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definition of personal information.
B. Personal Information Under Canadian Law
In Canada, the right to privacy is protected under section 8 of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (“Charter”), which creates a 
right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.61 There are a 
number of mechanisms at the federal and provincial level that protect 
information privacy. The most important federal statutes are the Privacy 
Act62 and the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act63 
(“PIPEDA”). The Privacy Act governs the personal information handled 
by federal government institutions, whereas the PIPEDA applies to private 
sector entities that collect, use or disclose personal information in the 
course of commercial activities.64 Both Acts define personal information 
as “information about an identifiable individual”,65 or, in the equally 
binding French language version, as “tout renseignement concernant un 
individu identifiable”.66 One of the drivers of the introduction of the 
61. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 
8 [Charter].
62. Privacy Act, RSC 1985, c P-21 [Canada Privacy Act].
63. Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, SC 2000, c 5 
[PIPEDA].
64. There are also a number of provincial statutes, including the Personal 
Information Protection Act, SBC 2003, c 63; Personal Health Information 
Protection Act, SO 2004, c 3, Schedule A; Loi sur la protection 
des renseignements personnels dans le secteur prive, CQLR c P-39.1.
65. Canada Privacy Act, supra note 62, s 3 contains further specification for 
the purposes of this Act, including that the information is “recorded in 
any form”. The definition wording, “information about an identifiable 
individual that is recorded in any form” is also contained in the Model 
Code for the Protection of Personal Information, National Standard of 
Canada CAN/CSA-Q830-96 at 1.
66. Loi sur la protection des renseignements personnels et les documents 
électroniques, LC 2000, c 5, s 2(1) [LPRDE]. 
18 
 
Witzleb & Wagner, When is Personal Data “About” or “Relating to” an Individual?
PIPEDA was the European Data Protection Directive,67 which prohibits 
the transfer of personal data to third countries that do not have adequate 
levels of privacy protection for personal information.68
The definition of personal information has been central in a 
number of judicial decisions and determinations of data protection 
commissioners. In Dagg v Canada (Minister of Finance), Justice La Forest 
described the definition in the Privacy Act as “undeniably expansive” and 
intending “to capture any information about a specific person, subject 
only to specific exceptions”.69 According to the Privacy Commissioner, 
the word “about” in the PIPEDA definition of personal information 
means that the information is “not just the subject of something but also 
relates to or concerns the subject”.70 Initially, the Privacy Commissioner 
interpreted this requirement rather narrowly. In a finding released in 
2001, the Office of the Privacy Commissioner (“OPC”) determined 
that the information contained in an individual prescription was not 
associated sufficiently with the physician who wrote it to qualify as 
67. EC, Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, [1995] 
OJ, L 281/31 [EC, Directive 95/46/EC]. 
68. See AT v Globe24h.com, 2017 FC 114 at para 49; Council of Europe, 
Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 2/2001 on the 
adequacy of the Canadian Personal Information and Electronic Documents 
Act, (2001) 5109/00/EN, WP39. 
69. Dagg v Canada (Minister of Finance), [1997] 2 SCR 403 at paras 68–69 
[emphasis in original]; see also Canada (Information Commissioner) v 
Canada (Commissioner of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police), 2003 SCC 
8 at para 23 [emphasis in original].
70. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “PIPEDA Interpretation 
Bulletin: Personal Information” (October 2013), online: OPC <https://
www.priv.gc.ca/en/privacy-topics/privacy-laws-in-canada/the-personal-
information-protection-and-electronic-documents-act-pipeda/pipeda-
compliance-help/pipeda-interpretation-bulletins/interpretations_02/> 
[emphasis added].
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personal information “about” the physician himself.71 This conclusion 
drew heavily on the consideration that a prescription is the outcome of a 
professional interaction between the involved physician and the treated 
patient, rather than a description of the physician himself or his activities 
apart from the fact that he issued the prescription.72 The OPC further 
referred to the purpose of the PIPEDA, as laid down in section 3, as 
an Act to recognise the right of privacy of individuals which, according 
to the OPC, does not, when balanced against legitimate commercial 
purposes, cover information that is only the result of the work activity of 
an individual.73 But subsequently, the OPC altered its position to a wider, 
contextual approach on the scope of the term “about”. Apart from the 
context of information production, the OPC now also takes into account 
the context of the information collection, its use and disclosure.74
In 2003, the OPC decided that sales statistics of individual employees 
are not only part of the company information a company generates but 
also reveal the on-the-job performance of individuals and, therefore, also 
qualify as personal information under the PIPEDA.75 In a comparable case 
in 2005, the OPC decided that the sales records of independent real estate 
agents were commercial information connected with their conducted 
business as well as personal information concerning the individual real 
71. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “PIPEDA Case Summary 
#2001-15” (2 October 2001), online: OPC <https://www.priv.gc.ca/
en/opc-actions-and-decisions/investigations/investigations-into-
businesses/2001/wn_011002/>. 
72. Ibid. 
73. Ibid.
74. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “The Privacy 
Commissioner of Canada’s Position at the Conclusion of the Hearings 
on the Statutory Review of PIPEDA” (November 2006), online: OPC 
<https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/advice-to-
parliament/2007/sub_070222_03/> [PCC, “The Privacy Commissioner 
of Canada’s Position”]. 
75. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “PIPEDA Case Summary 
#2003-220” (15 September 2003), online: OPC <https://www.priv.
gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/investigations/investigations-into-
businesses/2003/pipeda-2003-220/>.
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estate agent.76 The OPC also decided that information about property is 
personal information if it reveals something of a personal nature about 
an individual.77 For example, the purchase price of real estate in post-sale 
advertising could reveal personal traits of the buyer, such as her abilities 
to pay or to bargain.78
Of the judicial determinations, the decision in Canada (Information 
Commissioner), which the Australian Federal Court referred to, stands 
out. The matter concerned refusals by the Canadian Transportation 
Accident Investigation and Safety Board to disclose records in reliance 
on the “personal information” exception in section 19 of the Access to 
Information Act.79 Subsection 19(1) of the Act prohibits the disclosure 
of “personal information as defined in section 3 of the Privacy Act”.80 
The records in question were recordings and/or transcripts of air traffic 
control communications relating to four aviation occurrences, which 
were subject to investigations and public reports by the Safety Board.
Justice Desjardins (with whom Chief Justice Richard and Justice 
Evans agreed) conducted a two-tier test to determine whether data is 
“personal information”.81 Firstly, the data has to be about an individual. 
Secondly, the data has to permit or lead to the possible identification of the 
individual. The two elements “about” and “identifiable individual” have 
to be met cumulatively for any data to be seen as personal information 
76. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “PIPEDA Case 
Summary #2005-303” (31 May 2005), online: OPC <https://www.priv.
gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/investigations/investigations-into-
businesses/2005/pipeda-2005-303/>. 
77. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “PIPEDA Case Summary 
#2006-349” (24 August 2006), online: OPC <https://www.priv.
gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/investigations/investigations-into-
businesses/2006/pipeda-2006-349/>. 
78. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “PIPEDA Case Summary 
#2009-002” (20 February 2009), online: OPC <https://www.priv.
gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/investigations/investigations-into-
businesses/2009/pipeda-2009-002/>.
79. Access to Information Act, RSC 1985, c A-1. 
80. Ibid, s 19(1). 
81. Canada (Information Commissioner), supra note 3.
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under Canadian law.82 In Desjardins JA’s view, the two words “about” and 
“concernant” “shed little light on the precise nature of the information 
which relates to the individual”.83 However, her Ladyship added that 
the term “personal information” has to be understood “as equivalent 
to information falling within the individual’s right of privacy” because 
the purpose of data protection laws is to protect this right of privacy of 
individuals.84 Hence, any information can only be understood as “about” 
an individual when it involves subjects that “engage [an individual’s] right 
to privacy”,85 which is said to connote “concepts of intimacy, identity, 
dignity and integrity of the individual”.86 
In a statement reminiscent of the Australian Full Court decision, 
Desjardins JA observed: 
[t]he information at issue is not “about” an individual … the content of 
the communications is limited to the safety and navigation of aircraft, the 
general operation of the aircraft, and the exchange of messages on behalf of 
the public. They contain information about the status of the aircraft, weather 
conditions, matters associated with air traffic control and the utterances of the 
pilots and controllers. These are not subjects that engage the right of privacy 
of individuals.87
In Canada (Information Commissioner), the Court ruled that the 
disputed recordings and transcripts of air traffic control communications 
indeed enabled the identification of individual people and assisted in a 
determination as to how they performed their specific tasks in a certain 
situation. However, the information did not thereby qualify as personal 
information because the content of the information only affected their 
82. However, the subsequent decision of Gibson J in Gordon v Canada 
(Health), 2008 FC 258 appears to elide the two cumulative requirements 
when it states that (“information [is] “about” a particular individual if 
it “permits” or “leads” to the possible identification of the individual, 
whether alone or when combined with information from sources 
“otherwise available” including sources publicly available” at para 33).
83. Canada (Information Commissioner), supra note 3 at para 43.
84. Ibid at paras 44–48. 
85. Ibid at para 53. 
86. Ibid at para 52.
87. Ibid at para 53.
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“professional and non-personal nature”88 and therefore “[did] not match 
the concept of “privacy” and the values that concept [was] meant to 
protect”.89 Access to the recordings could therefore not be withheld 
on the basis of the “personal information” exception. There are also a 
number of access of information cases at the provincial level that made a 
distinction between information “about” an individual and information 
“about” something else,90 in particular where the information related to 
an individual acting in their professional or official capacity.
However, another access to information decision of the Federal 
Court of Appeal a year later demonstrates that these determinations 
can include fine distinctions. In Janssen-Ortho Inc v Canada (Minister of 
Health),91 the Court held that the documents revealing the names and 
business contact information of employees of the appellant company, as 
well as the views they expressed to Health Canada on the withdrawal of 
a prescription drug from the Canadian market, constituted the personal 
information of these employees. In Husky Oil Operations Limited v 
Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador Offshore Petroleum Board,92 the 
Federal Court of Appeal recently suggested that these two decisions are 
not inconsistent but can be explained by differences in the nature of the 
information concerned. Justice Montigny (Justice Wood concurring) also 
affirmed that a purposive approach “best carries out Parliament’s intent in 
adopting the Access Act and the Privacy Act”.93 However, each of the Acts 
using the definition of personal information, the Access to Information 
Act, the Privacy Act and PIPEDA differ in their statutory objectives, 
particularly in relation to the balance between personal privacy and the 
88. Ibid at para 54. 
89. Ibid.
90. See further, Teresa Scassa, “Geographical Information as ‘Personal 
Information’” (2010) 10:2 Oxford University Commonwealth Law 
Journal 185 at 194–96.
91. Janssen-Ortho Inc v Canada (Minister of Health), 2007 FCA 252 aff’d in 
Information Commissioner of Canada v Canada (Natural Resources), 2014 
FC 917.
92. Husky Oil Operations Limited v Canada-Newfoundland and Labrador 
Offshore Petroleum Board, 2018 FCA 10.
93. Ibid at para 45.
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other objectives they need to be fulfilled. Under a purposive approach to 
the definition of personal information, it can be argued that the degree 
of connection required between the information and the individual may 
need to differ between privacy and access-to-information cases,94 despite 
the fact that the Access to Information Act adopts the definition in the 
Privacy Act. 
In conclusion, the Canadian definitions of personal information 
in the Privacy Act and the PIPEDA have the cumulative requirements 
that the information allows the identification of an individual and that 
it is also “about” an individual, which requires an evaluation of the link 
between the information and the individual. The evaluative task is to 
be undertaken by reference to the purpose of the legislation. Where 
information does not involve subject-matter that engages an individual’s 
privacy rights, the information is not personal information, even if it may 
identify an individual. However, this determination can make difficulties 
in some cases, particularly where it is unclear whether the information 
affects an individual in a personal capacity.
C. European Union Law
It has been acknowledged that the European Data Protection Directive 
(“DPD”),95 which was in force from 1995 until its replacement with 
the General Data Protection Regulation in May 2018, had a “major 
transformational impact” on Canadian privacy law.96 One of the main 
indicators of the influence of the European Union data privacy regime 
on Canada is the similarity of the definitions used in the DPD and the 
PIPEDA. According to the Canadian Privacy Commissioner, the “key 
goal in drafting the definition of personal information in the PIPEDA 
was to ensure that Canadian law was harmonized with European law”.97 
The harmonisation of Canadian and European Union law through the 
94. Scassa, supra note 90 at 197–98 and 209–10.
95. EC, Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 67. 
96. Jennifer McClennan & Vadim Schick, “‘O, Privacy’ Canada’s Importance 
in the Development of the International Data Privacy Regime” (2006) 
38:3 Georgetown Journal of International Law 669 at 671. 
97. PCC, “The Privacy Commissioner of Canada’s Position”, supra note 74.
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adoption of similar terminology and a similar level of protection was 
intended to avoid obstacles for transatlantic trade.98
The definition of personal information in section 2(1) of the PIPEDA 
as “information about an identifiable individual”99 picks up not only on 
the Canadian Privacy Act but also on the DPD.
1. Personal Data Under the European Data Protection 
Directive
The English language version of Article 2 of the DPD provided that:
“personal data” shall mean any information relating to an identified or 
identifiable natural person (“data subject”); an identifiable person is one who 
can be identified, directly or indirectly …100
This article closely resembled the Canadian definition as described above, 
even though the wording differs slightly. The PIPEDA uses the word 
“about” to describe the necessary link between the information and the 
individual, while the DPD uses the term “relating to”. The similarity 
between the Canadian and European definition is even more apparent 
in the respective versions in the French language. In section 2(1) of 
the PIPEDA, personal information is described as “tout renseignement 
concernant un individu identifiable”,101 whereas the French version of 
the DPD defined personal data as “toute information concernant une 
personne physique identifiée ou identifiable”.102 In other words, both 
jurisdictions made use of the word “concernant” to describe the necessary 
link.
This definition of personal data within the DPD shows that European 
Union law also demanded that the information in question must relate to 
the individual to qualify as personal data. This is also in line with Article 
98. Ibid.
99. PIPEDA, supra note 63, s 2(1).
100. EC, Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 67, art 2(a). 
101. LPRDE, supra note 66, s 2(1).
102. EC, Directive 95/46/CE du Parlement européen et du conseil, du 24 octobre 
1995, relative à la protection des personnes physiques à l’égard du traitement 
des données à caractère personnel et à la libre circulation de ces données, 
[1995] OJ, L 281/31, art 2(a).
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2(a) of the Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data (“Convention 108”), which defines 
“personal data” as “any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
individual”.103 This Convention is a Council of Europe treaty to which all 
member states of the European Union are bound. The DPD (as well as 
the new GDPR) are considered to be acts implementing the Convention 
108, as the European Union now exercises the legislative power in the 
field of privacy law which was previously assigned to its member states.104
It is unclear what kind of connection between the information in 
question and an individual is required under the DPD (and now the 
GDPR) to link the information to the individual being. Some scholars 
assume that under European Union law, the term “relating to” has no 
discrete meaning and thus is generally fulfilled if the data reveals an 
identified or identifiable data subject.105 However, a closer look reveals 
a more complex situation. A Working Paper on the concept of personal 
data issued by the Article 29 Working Party (an advisory body established 
103. Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic 
Processing of Personal Data, 28 January 1981, Eur TS 108 (entered into 
force 1 October 1985), art 2(a) [Convention 108]. 
104. On the obligations of the EU in relation to treaties signed by its member 
states, see International Fruit Company NV v Produktschap voor Groenten 
en Fruit, [1971] EUECJ R-54/71 at para 14 et seq.
105. On the DPD, see Bygrave, supra note 34 at 129–30; Paul M Schwartz 
& Daniel P Solove, “Reconciling Personal Information in the United 
States and European Union” (2014) 102:4 California Law Review 877. 
On the GDPR, see Stefan Ernst in Boris P Paal & Daniel A Pauly, eds, 
Datenschutz-Grundverordnung (Munich: Beck, 2017), art 4 at paras 3 
et seq; Hans-Hermann Schild in Heinrich A Wolff & Stefan Brink, eds, 
Beck’scher Online-Kommentar Datenschutzrecht, 20 ed (Munich: Beck, 
2017) (loose-leaf consulted on 30 August 2017), art 4 at paras 3 et seq. 
Both of these commentaries do not consider the term “relating to” in any 
detail.
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under the DPD106) provides further guidance as to how this term shall 
be interpreted.107 The Working Party stated that “[i]n general terms, 
information can be considered to ‘relate’ to an individual when it is about 
that individual”.108 
The Working Party’s Opinion first identifies situations in which 
it is self-evident that information relates to an individual, such as the 
information contained in one’s personnel file or medical file, or images 
of a person’s video interview. It then deals with situations in which it is 
more difficult to establish the relationship between information and an 
individual, such as when the data concerns objects, processes or events 
in the first place, not individuals.109 Also, in these cases the information 
can “indirectly” or “in some circumstances” relate to an individual. The 
Opinion identifies three key elements — the content element, purpose 
element and result element — and suggests that at least one element is 
required to establish the necessary connection.110
The “content” element is fulfilled when information is given about 
a particular individual. To determine if the link between the content of 
the information is close enough to establish such a connection, one has 
106. The Article 29 Working Party was an independent advisory body 
composed of representatives of the data protection supervisory authorities 
of each Member State, the European Data Protection Supervisor and the 
European Commission. Its functions included to advise the European 
Commission and to contribute the uniform application of data protection 
rules throughout the European Union: cf. recital 65 of the DPD. Upon 
entry into force of the GDPR, it has been replaced by the European Data 
Protection Board, see art 68.
107. Council of Europe, Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 
4/2007 on the concept of personal data, (2007) Working Paper 136 
[Opinion 4/2007]. 
108. Ibid at 9 [emphasis in original].
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid at 10 et seq. Similarly, see Information Commissioner’s 
Office, “Determining what is personal data” (2007), online ICO <https://
ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1554/determining-what-
is-personal-data.pdf>; Martin Eßer in Martin Eßer, Philipp Kramer & Kai 
von Lewinski, eds, Auernhammer DSGVO BDSG, 6 ed (Cologne: Carl 
Heymanns, 2018), art 4 at paras 10–11.
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to take into account all circumstances of the case and the meaning of the 
word “relate” in the general non-juridical linguistic usage.111 
The “purpose” element is present when the disputed information is 
used or is likely to be used with the purpose of evaluating or treating 
an individual on this basis of this information in comparison to other 
individuals.112 
Finally, the “result” element can be considered to exist when the use 
of the information in question is likely to have an impact on the rights 
and interests of a certain individual. The result does not necessarily have 
to be of major impact but rather it is sufficient if the individual may be 
treated differently compared to other individuals as a result of processing 
that data.113 
The Working Party gives the example of data concerning a taxi’s 
location which is collected by the taxi company for the purpose of fleet 
management, providing a better service to the customers and saving 
fuel by allocating the closest taxi to the customer. The content of the 
geolocation data, according to the Working Party, is only connected 
with the taxi cars, not the drivers, and its purpose is only to enhance 
business processes. However, because of the necessary link between the 
geolocation information about a taxi and the person who is driving it, 
the data allows the monitoring of the performance of the taxi drivers 
themselves. Therefore, under the application of the purpose element, the 
data is to be considered personal data of the taxi driver.114
The overall conclusion from the Opinion is that the Article 29 
Working Party interprets the meaning of the term “concerning”, as used 
in the DPD, in a rather wide sense, especially in comparison to the 
Australian and Canadian understanding of personal information. It does 
not only include data that is directly about a particular person but also 
data that is used for the purpose of differential treatment of that person 
to another or is otherwise likely to have some impact on the rights of a 
person.
111. Opinion 4/2007, supra note 107.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid at 11.
114. Ibid.
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It is, therefore, sufficient if the data allows any conclusions about an 
individual to be drawn or if the data is collected with such an objective in 
mind. A further consequence of this broad notion of personal data is that 
a specific piece of information can represent the personal data of more 
than just one person at the same time.115
2. Personal Data in the Case Law of the European Court 
of Justice
The case law of the European Court of Justice (“ECJ”) supports, at least 
indirectly, this broad interpretation given by the Article 29 Working Party. 
In the two decisions of Scarlet Extended and Breyer, the ECJ dealt with 
IP addresses and ruled that they are generally protected personal data.116 
In these decisions, the Court did not touch on the issue of whether IP 
addresses are information relating only to an electronical device, rather 
than the human being using the device. Instead, the ECJ focused only 
on the question of whether an individual can be reasonably identified on 
the basis of an IP address.117 The focus in both decisions on the criterion 
of identifiability in the DPD’s legal definition of personal data suggests 
that the necessary link between the data in question and the individual, 
as required by the criterion in Article 2 of the DPD that the data must 
“relate to” the individual, is fairly low. 
In its interpretation of the term personal information, the ECJ 
did not expressly consider comparative materials, despite the fact that 
the definition has international counterparts including international 
agreements, such as the Convention 108 as mentioned above, and the law 
of Canada. This is, however, in line with the other judgments rendered 
by the ECJ in which the Court showed a reluctance to engage with third 
115. Ibid at 12.
116. Scarlet Extended, supra note 46 at para 51; Breyer, supra note 46 at paras 
38 et seq.
117. Breyer, supra note 46 at para 39.
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country law in its reasoning.118
3. Changes Under the New General Data Protection 
Legislation
The DPD has been replaced with the new General Data Protection 
Regulation (“GDPR”) since May 2018.119 The main driver for this change 
was the desire to have a uniform level of data protection between the 
European Union member states which existed under the old DPD. 
According to Article 288 paragraph 2 of the Treaty of the Functioning of 
the European Union (“TFEU”), a European Union regulation is binding 
in its entirety and directly applicable in all European Union member 
states.120
The English language version of the definition of personal data in 
Article 4 paragraph 1 of the new GDPR remains largely unchanged 
compared to the DPD and, in particular, still requires the information 
to be “relating to” an identifiable natural person.121 Interestingly, the 
French definition now utilizes the term “se rapportant” instead of the 
former “concernant” to describe the necessary connection. Although 
118. Cf. Christopher Kuner, “Third Country Law In The CJEU’s Data 
Protection Judgments” European Law Blog (12 July 2017), online: 
European Law Blog <https://europeanlawblog.eu/2017/07/12/third-
country-law-in-the-cjeus-data-protection-judgments/>. 
119. GDPR, supra note 4.
120. Cf. Ibid at paras 9–13; Paul de Hert & Vagelis Papakonstantinou, “The 
New General Data Protection Regulation: Still a Sound System for the 
Protection of Individuals?” (2016) 32:2 Computer Law & Security 
Review 182; Peter Schantz, “Die Datenschutz-Grundverordnung – 
Beginn einer neuen Zeitrechnung im Datenschutzrecht” (2016) 69:26 
Neue Juristische Wochenschrift 1841.
121. However, it is worth mentioning that the scope of the definition was 
expanded by lowering the requirements for the identification of an 
individual. Cf. Bert-Jaap Koops, “The Trouble with European Data 
Protection Law” (2014) 4:4 International Data Privacy Law 250; Bert 
van der Sloot, “Do Data Protection Rules Protect the Individual and 
Should They? An Assessment of the Proposed General Data Protection 
Regulation” (2014) 4:4 International Data Privacy Law 307; Schwartz & 
Solove, supra note 105. 
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all language versions are equally authentic in European Union law,122 
and therefore the alteration of the wording of an article in one of the 
language versions might indicate a different meaning, the proposal for 
the GDPR was originally drafted (only) in English. This suggests that no 
amendment to the legal definition of personal data was intended by the 
introduction of the GDPR. This view is supported by the fact that the 
Explanatory Memorandum to the draft of the GDPR did not address this 
modification of the definitional text.123 Like its predecessor, the GDPR 
does not provide clarification of the term “relating to”. Recital 26 of the 
GDPR only repeats recital 26 of the DPD and goes to great lengths to 
explain how to determine whether a person is identifiable but does not 
explain when the link between the data and an individual is close enough 
so that data is “relating to” the person.124 
In conclusion, the most authoritative guidance on this issue remains 
the working paper of the Article 29 Working Group referred to above. 
According to this, data “relates to” an individual under European Union 
data protection law when the data is likely to have an impact on the 
individual or her position in comparison to others or the data can be 
used to describe the individual in one way or another. In doing so, the 
European Data Protection framework only makes low demands on 
the necessary link between the data in question and an individual to 
categorise the data as personal data under European Union law. As the 
Canadian definition of personal information is derived from the European 
notion, an argument could be made that this understanding would also 
be a suitable starting point for the interpretation of the Canadian term. 
However, this position is currently not reflected by Canadian case law 
interpreting the PIPEDA definition, which does not refer to European 
Union law or its understanding by the ECJ. 
122. Cf. Srl CILFIT and Lanificio di Gavardo SpA v Ministry of Health, [1982] 
EUECJ R-283/81 at paras 18 et seq.
123. EC, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation), 
COM(2012) 11 final at 7.
124. GDPR, supra note 4.
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III. How Do Australia, Canada, and the European 
Union Deal with IP addresses as Personal 
Information?
This different understanding of the terms “about” or “relating to” in 
Australian, Canadian and EU law leads to a different comprehension of 
personal data, respectively personal information which, in turn, affects 
the scope of application of the respective data privacy regimes. The 
stricter the requirements for the connection between the information 
and the affected individual, the narrower the term of personal data or 
personal information ought to be understood. This, in turn, results in a 
narrower scope of application of the respective data protection legislation. 
Accordingly, the European data protection law which requires only a 
tenuous connection between the two elements has a broader scope of 
application than the Canadian and Australian data protection law.
This can be clearly illustrated using the example of IP addresses, 
which form the backbone of electronic communication. IP addresses are 
used to allow the clear identification of a device in a network by attaching 
a unique but mostly temporary number to it.125 The IP addresses assigned 
to any electronic device in a computer network allow the transmission 
of data between devices. The three jurisdictions do not share a common 
understanding of how and when IP addresses should be classified as 
personal data, as will be shown in this section.
A. Australian Approach
In Telstra AAT, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal ruled “that an IP 
address is not information about an individual”.126 The AAT expressed 
the view that IP addresses, where they change regularly over the life of 
the respective device, only identify the respective device itself but are 
not information “about” the user of the device, because any connection 
125. Information Sciences Institute, Internet Protocol: DARPA Internet Program 
Protocol Specification, University of Southern California Working Paper, 
RFC 791 (Marina del Rey, California: University of Southern California, 
1981) at 5–10.
126. Telstra AAT, supra note 19 at para 113.
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between the IP address and the user would be “ephemeral”.127 As the 
AAT put it, such IP addresses are “not about the person but about the 
means by which data is transmitted from a person’s mobile device over 
the internet”, and, therefore, they are not considered to be personal 
information under Australia’s privacy regime.128 
While the Federal Court of Australia upheld the decision of the AAT, 
the appeal was limited to the interpretation of the definition of “personal 
information”, not its application. The Full Court merely held that the 
words “about an individual” had meaning and required consideration 
before the subsequent issue arose of whether this information identified 
that individual.129 The Federal Court declined to consider whether the 
AAT applied its definition correctly because this was not raised in the 
appeal.130 The Privacy Commissioner decided not to challenge the Full 
Court decision any further.131 In its updated guidance on the meaning of 
“personal information”, the issue of IP addresses is not covered. 
However, another recent decision of the AAT, issued after the Full 
Court decision,132 specifically adopts the reasoning of Telstra AAT. In 
Freelancer International Pty Ltd and Australian Information Commissioner, 
Freelancer operated a website that required user registration and a 
login by registered users. Freelancer recorded the login IP addresses 
and associated these IP addresses with particular registrant accounts, 
including by displaying the IP address used in a session in a Welcome 
message to the registrant. Nonetheless, the AAT held that while a user’s 
identity might reasonably be ascertained from the information available 
to the website operator, the IP address information was “not “about” 
an invidual. It was information “about” the login itself ”.133 Like Telstra 
127. Ibid.
128. Ibid.
129. Telstra FCAFC, supra note 2 at paras 62–65.
130. Ibid at para 65.
131. Austl, Commonwealth, Office of the Australian Information 
Commissioner, Statement on Privacy Commissioner v Telstra Corporation 
Limited Federal Court decision (OAIC, 2017).
132. Freelancer International Pty Ltd and Australian Information Commissioner, 
[2017] AATA 2426.
133. Ibid at para 69.
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AAT, this decision appears to assume that when information, such as an 
IP address, is about enabling a communication, it cannot also be about 
the individual engaged in that communication. This is in contrast to the 
decision of the Full Court, which did not subscribe to the view that the 
classification task is binary and stated specifically that information can 
have more than one subject matter. 
In summary, while decisions of the AAT, both before and after Telstra 
FCAFC, suggest that IP addresses of electronic devices do not qualify as 
“personal information” and, hence, are not subject to Australian privacy 
legislation, these decisions are not completely free from doubt and 
potentially open to challenge.
B. Canadian Approach
As pointed out above, the Canadian definition of personal information 
resembles the Australian approach. Nonetheless, its application in 
practice appears to differ.
The Privacy Commissioner of Canada outlined that IP addresses do 
not only constitute the technical base for electronic communication but 
also provide a potential starting point to unlock additional information 
about the individual who used the electronic device which identified itself 
via the IP address in question.134 A study conducted by the Canadian 
Privacy Commissioner showed that an IP address enabled the creation 
of a detailed profile of the device user including the geolocation of the 
user and other web activities as well as e-mail addresses from the user.135 
Therefore, the Canadian Privacy Commissioner classified IP addresses 
as being sufficiently linked to the individual using them and, therefore, 
134. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “What an IP Address Can 
Reveal About You” (May 2013), online: OPC < https://www.priv.gc.ca/
en/opc-actions-and-decisions/research/explore-privacy-research/2013/
ip_201305/>. 
135. Ibid. 
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qualified them as personal information under Canadian law.136 The 
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in R v Spencer137 provides 
further illustration of the link between an IP address and an identifiable 
user. In that decision, the Court decided that internet users may have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy over their internet activities and that a 
warrantless police request that an ISP provided identifying information 
about a subscriber of a particular IP address amounted to an unlawful 
search and violated the user’s section 8 Charter rights.138 Justice Cromwell, 
writing for the Court, further considered the application of the PIPEDA 
to subscriber information.139 His Lordship concluded that there was a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in the subscriber information as the 
disclosure of such information “will often amount to the identification 
of a user with intimate or sensitive activities being carried out online, 
usually on the understanding that these activities would be anonymous” 
and, therefore, a request by a government institution to reveal this 
information “amounts to a search”.140
C. European Approach
Under European Union data protection law, IP addresses normally fall 
within the scope of personal data. In 2011, the ECJ ruled in Scarlet 
Extended that IP addresses may allow the precise identification of the 
136. Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Metadata and Privacy: 
A Technical and Legal Overview” (October 2014), online: OPC <https://
www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/research/explore-privacy-
research/2014/md_201410/>; Office of the Privacy Commissioner of 
Canada, “PIPEDA Case Summary #2001-25” (20 November 2001), 
online: OPC < https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/
investigations/investigations-into-businesses/2001/pipeda-2001-025/>. 
See also Eloïse Gratton, “Personalization, Analytics, and Sponsored 
Services: The Challenges of Applying PIPEDA to Online Tracking and 
Profiling Activities” (2010) 8:2 Canadian Journal of Law & Technology 
299 at 300–05.
137. R v Spencer, 2014 SCC 43 [Spencer].
138. Charter, supra note 61, s 8.
139. Spencer, supra note 137 at paras 52 et seq. 
140. Ibid at para 66.
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persons using the addresses and, therefore, qualify as personal data.141 
This ruling adopted the opinion delivered by the European Advocate 
General, which expressed the view that an IP address “may be classified 
as personal data inasmuch as it may allow a person to be identified by 
reference to an identification number or any other information specific 
to him”.142 However, the decision in Scarlet Extended related to the 
introduction of a system for filtering electronic communications by the 
ISPs and, therefore, by entities which not only had access to IP addresses 
but — being the provider — also to the necessary data to link the IP 
addresses with specific users of the service.
The ECJ later expanded this view to IP addresses held by entities 
other than the ISPs. In Breyer, the ECJ stated that the notion of personal 
data in Article 2(a) of the DPD does not necessarily require that the data 
on its own allow the data subject to be identified or that the controller 
of the data must be able to identify the data subject without the help 
of a third party.143 Instead, the ECJ ruled that it is sufficient if the data 
controller in question “has the means which may likely reasonably be 
used in order to identify the data subject, with the assistance of other 
persons, namely the competent authority” and other private entities.144 
This criterion is fulfilled if the data controller “has the legal means which 
enable it to identify the data subject with additional data”145 held by third 
parties, as long as this does not require “a disproportionate effort in terms 
of time, cost and man-power, so that the risk of identification appears in 
reality to be insignificant”.146 The ECJ then applied this test to dynamic 
IP addresses stored by a website operator and came to the conclusion that 
such addresses allow the identification of the respective device connecting 
to the internet under the IP address in question because website operators 
may gain the necessary additional data from the competent authority 
141. Scarlet Extended, supra note 46 at para 51.
142. EC, Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón delivered on 14 April 2011, 
2011:255 at paras 74–78. 
143. Breyer, supra note 46 at paras 41 et seq.
144. Ibid at para 48.
145. Ibid at para 49 [emphasis added]. 
146. Ibid at para 46. 
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or the respective ISP. The ECJ finally concluded that under these 
circumstances, dynamic IP addresses constitute personal data within the 
meaning of Article 2(a) of the Data Protection Directive.147
This finding by the ECJ was met with approval among European 
scholars148 so that the qualification of IP addresses as personal data under 
European Union law is no longer in serious doubt. As the definition 
of personal data in the GDPR remained virtually unchanged from the 
definition given by the DPD, the findings by the ECJ must be taken to 
remain applicable under the GDPR.149 In the recent decision of Benedik 
v Slovenia,150 the European Court of Human Rights held that subscriber 
information associated with a dynamic IP address fell within the scope of 
protection of Article 8 (right to private life) of the European Convention 
on Human Rights. In doing so, the Court adopted the jurisprudence of 
the ECJ in the Scarlet Extended and Breyer decisions and also specifically 
referred to the factually similar decision of the Canadian Supreme Court 
in Spencer.151 
IV. Conclusion
Despite employing similar definitions of personal data or personal 
information in their data protection laws, these terms have been interpreted 
differently by courts in Australia, Canada and the European Union. Part 
of these differences may also be due to the fact that the courts across 
these jurisdictions differ in their willingness to consider international 
materials in their decisions. As a result, the scope of application of the 
147. Ibid at para 49.
148. Cf. Schild, supra note 105 at para 19; Heiko Richter, “Datenschutzrecht: 
Speicherung von IP-Adressen beim Besuch einer Website” (2016) 
27:23 Europäische Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht 912 at 913; Frederik 
Zuiderveen Borgesius, “The Breyer Case of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union: IP Addresses and the Personal Data Definition” (2017) 
3:1 European Data Protection Law Review 130 at 135. This is in line with 
the prevailing view in legal literature before the ECJ judgments.
149. Borgesius, ibid at 136.
150. Benedik v Slovenia, No 62357/14 (24 April 2018).
151. Scarlet Extended, supra note 46; Breyer, supra note 46; Spencer, supra note 
137.
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respective data protection legislation does not coincide. This has the 
potential to create friction between these jurisdictions by forming an 
obstacle to the free flow of personal data as most countries only allow 
the export of personal data to third jurisdictions if an adequate level of 
protection is guaranteed. If one country establishes a narrower term of 
personal data than other countries, thereby constraining the scope of its 
data protection legislation, the export of such data into this country can 
become problematic. The lack of uniformity has been demonstrated by 
the example of IP addresses, which Australian law treats differently to 
Canada and the European Union..
The lack of harmonised interpretation could be addressed if the 
jurisdictions put more effort into creating alignment between the legal 
definitions they employ. Initial approaches exist, such as the Convention 
108, which aims to create a common framework of data protection for its 
participating countries.152 Even apart from international treaties, there are 
also inherent connections between the different jurisdictions. As shown 
above, the Canadian PIPEDA was enacted also against the background 
of the European data protection legislation and utilized its formulations. 
Australian case law, in turn, has made some limited references to a 
Canadian decision in support of its interpretation of Australia’s data 
protection laws. However, against the background of increasingly 
global data flows, the time has come to develop these connections more 
systematically and, as the European Court on Human Rights has done in 
Benedik, to adopt a comparative approach to interpreting the key terms 
of data protection laws wherever possible. 
152. Convention 108, supra note 103.
